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1. NATURE OF THE FUKUSHIMA ACCIDENT 
The accidents at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power
plants are striking as they not only resulted in simultaneous
core damage in multiple units, but also there was a high
possibility of failure of the reactor vessels and primary
containment vessels in all three reactors. Though the
radiological release is estimated to be about 10% of the
Chernobyl accident [1, 2], the severity of the accident in
terms of scale and number of units involved is unprecedented.
The accident was classified as International Nuclear Events
Scale (INES) level 7 accident [1]. 
The accident progression, including the cause of the
accident, the response of the reactor and safety system,
recovery actions, and core damage progression leading to
a release of radioactive material, were investigated and
reported by the Japanese Government [1], TEPCO [2]
and international experts [3]. However, the status of the
damaged reactor vessel, and damage to the primary
containment vessel are still under investigation. 
Though the occurrence of severe accidents were
evidenced in the Three Mile Island (TMI) and Chernobyl
accident, the measures for the prevention and mitigation
of a severe accident were not strictly regulated. In most
countries, severe accident prevention and mitigation
measures were recommended only for new builds, as
voluntary actions to enhance the safety, while provision
of severe accident management guidelines were recom-
mended for operating reactors. It is stated in reference 1
that “While the Japanese National Government recognized
that further safety regulations were unnecessary as the
safety of nuclear power plant in Japan was fully ensured
by the present safety measures, it recommended that
electric utilities should perform self-disciplined safety
efforts in order to reduce a risk of accident and to further
enhance safety.” 
This paper revisits the Fukushima accident to draw lessons in the aspect of nuclear safety considering the fact that the
Fukushima accident resulted in core damage for three nuclear power plants simultaneously and that there is a high possibility
of a failure of the integrity of reactor vessel and primary containment vessel.
A brief review on the accident progression at Fukushima nuclear power plants is discussed to highlight the nature and
characteristic of the event. As the severe accident management measures at the Fukushima Daiich nuclear power plants seem
to be not fully effective, limitations of current severe accident management strategy are discussed to identify the areas for the
potential improvements including core cooling strategy, containment venting, hydrogen control, depressurization of primary
system, and proper indication of event progression. The gap between the Fukushima accident event progression and current
understanding of severe accident phenomenology including the core damage, reactor vessel failure, containment failure, and
hydrogen explosion are discussed.
Adequacy of current safety goals are also discussed in view of the socio-economic impact of the Fukushima accident. As a
conclusion, it is suggested that an investigation on a coherent integrated safety principle for the severe accident and
development of innovative mitigation features is necessary for robust and resilient nuclear power system.
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The severe accidents at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
power plants happened unexpectedly. The event occurred
due to a combination of an earthquake and tsunami in an
unprecedented scale. The question is “Was it possible to
predict and be prepared for this kind of accident?” Certainly,
it seems to not be. 
Though external events are considered in the design
of the nuclear power plant, as recommended in safety guide
IAEA-NS-G-1.5 [4], the Fukushima accident suggests that
the very low probability of extreme external events can
be overlooked, which can lead to catastrophic consequences.
Different perspectives of external hazards, such as an
impact of simultaneous occurrence of external events, the
need for the provision of a long term electricity backup
capacity, and a potential impact of terror, have to be
investigated. The Fukushima accident is like a “Black
Swan” [5], as it lay outside the realm of regular expectations.
It came with catastrophic consequences and we were able
to explain it only after the fact. Therefore, it might be
wise to focus on how we can be prepared for this kind of
severe accident in the future, rather than focus on the
reasons for this particular accident happening.
The nuclear industry tended to be confident that
nuclear power plants were safe, and there was very little
chance of severe accidents like TMI or Chernobyl. This
overconfidence could be one of the reasons why we were
not able to predict the Fukushima accident, and why the
defense-in-depth implemented, including the support
system and emergency preparedness in the plant, was not
robust enough to avoid the substantial release of
radioactive material.
The nature of a low probability severe accident has
often led to quite different views for the implementation
of preventive and mitigation features among countries.
The range of views has been wide, between pessimistic
and optimistic. The gap should be narrowed to be
properly prepared for the highly improbable event of a
severe accident .
2. ACCIDENT PROGRESSION AT FUKUSHIMA
DAIICH NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS  
This section provides an overview of the chronology
from the occurrence of the accident to the emergency
measures taken at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power station.
In addition, highlights of the event progression, including
plant response, operator recovery and unresolved issues,
are discussed. 
2.1 Plant Configuration and Event Progression for
Each Unit
The event progression and plant specification discussed
here are excerpts taken from Reference 1, 2 and 3. Major
design parameters for the Fukushima Daiichi Units 1 through
4 are summarized in Table 1. 
The earthquake which occurred at 14:46 on March
11, 2011 brought Fukushima Daiichi Units 1 through 3,
which were in operation, to a reactor trip, due to the high
earthquake acceleration. Unit 4 was under outage for
periodic inspection when the earthquake occurred. All
fuel had been removed from the reactor and transferred
to the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). Units 5 and 6 were under
outage for periodic inspection, with all fuel in the reactors
and all control rods inserted. 
After the automatic shutdown of the reactors, the station
power supply was switched to offsite power. However,
the power plants were unable to receive electricity from
the offsite power transmission lines, because some of the
transmission towers had collapsed due to the earthquake.
For this reason, the emergency Diesel Generators (DGs) for
each Unit were automatically started to maintain cooling
of the reactors and the spent fuel pools.
Later, all the emergency DGs, except at Unit 6, stopped,
because their seawater cooling systems and metal-clad
switchgears were submerged due to the tsunami that fol-
lowed the earthquake. The result was that all AC power
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Table 1. Major Design Parameters of Fukushima Daiichi Units 1 through 4
Unit 1
1971
BWR-3
460
1,380
IC
HPCI (1)
ADS
CS (4)
Mark-I
Unit 2
1974
BWR-4
784
2,381
RCIC
HPCI (1)
ADS
CS (2)
LPCI (2)
Mark-I
Commercial Operation
Reactor Design
Rated Power (MWe)
Thermal Power (MWt)
Isolation Cooling System
ECCS Configuration
Primary Containment Vessel
Unit 3
1976
BWR-4
784
2,381
RCIC
HPCI (1)
ADS
CS (2)
LPCI (2)
Mark-I
Unit 4
1978
BWR-4
784
2,381
RCIC
HPCI (1)
ADS
CS (2)
LPCI (2)
Mark-I
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supply was lost at Units 1 to 4 . This led to Station Black
Out (SBO) scenarios for these Units, which had been
considered a hypothetical event [6], while emergency
power to Units 5 and 6 was recovered. It has to be noted
that following the earthquake, all the safety systems,
including on-site emergency electrical power, operated
properly as designed. It was the subsequent tsunami that
caused the major damage.
At 15:42 on March 11, TEPCO determined that the
plant  condition  fell under the category of specific initial
events defined in Article 10 of the Act on Special Measures
Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, and notified
the national government, local governments, and other
parties concerned.
At 16:36 on the same day, TEPCO found they were
unable to monitor the water level in the reactors of Units
1 and 2, and determined that the conditions of these Units
were “unable to inject water by the emergency core cooling
system” as defined in Article 15 of the Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness Act. 
TEPCO opened the valve of the Isolation Condenser
(IC) of Unit 1, and in an effort to maintain the functions
of the IC, injected fresh water into its shell side. Later it
was reported that the operator stopped operation of IC
due to a rapid cool down of the reactor coolant system,
according to the procedure, but was not able to activate
the IC again [2].
Immediately after the tsunami, TEPCO could not
confirm the operation of the Reactor Core Isolation
Cooling (RCIC) system of Unit 2, but at 03:00 on March
12, they confirmed that it was operating properly. Unit 3
was cooled using its RCIC system, and as a result, the
Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) pressure and water
levels remained stable.
In order to recover the power supply, TEPCO took
emergency measures, such as making arrangements for
power supply vehicles, but the efforts were not effective
due to damages caused by the earthquake and tsunami. 
It was confirmed around 23:00 on March 11 that the
radiation level in the turbine building of Unit 1 was
increasing. In addition, at 00:49 on March 12, TEPCO
confirmed that there was a possibility that the PCV pressure
of Unit 1 had exceeded the maximum operating pressure.
For this reason, the Minister of Economy, Trade and
Industry ordered TEPCO to reduce the PCV pressure of
Units 1 and 2. A brief summary of the events progression
of each unit is summarized in Table 2. 
At 05:46 on March 12, the company began alternative
water injection (fresh water) into the reactor Pressure
Vessel (RPV) for Unit 1, using fire engines. In addition,
TEPCO began preparations for PCV venting because the
PCV pressure was high, but the work ran into trouble
because the radiation level in the reactor building was
already high. It was around 14:30 on the same day that a
Table 2. A Brief Summary of Event Progression
March
11th
Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3
14:46 Earthquake
15:42 SBO 
16:36 Inability of water injection of
the Emergency Core Cooling System
(HPCI was not working)
14:46 Earthquake
15:42 SBO 
16:36 Inability of water injection of the
Emergency Core Cooling System
(RCIC was working)
14:46 Earthquake
15:42 SBO 
March
12th
01:20 Increase of PCV pressure
10:17 Start to vent
15:36 Sound of Explosion 20:20 Start
to inject sea water
water
(RCIC and HPCI was working)
March
13th 11:00 started to vent
05:10 Inability of water injection of
the Emergency Core Cooling System
08:41 Start to vent
13:12 Seawater Injection to RPV 
March
14th
13:25 Loss of reactor cooling function
16:34 Start Seawater Injection
22:50  Increase of PCV pressure
March
15th
00:02 Start to vent
06:10 Sound of Explosion 
06:20 Possible damage of SC
05:20 Started to vent
07:44 Increase of PCV pressure
11:01 Sound of Explosion 
decrease in the PCV pressure level was actually confirmed.
Subsequently, at 15:36 on the same day, what is thought
to be a hydrogen explosion  occurred in the upper part of
the Unit 1 reactor building.
Meanwhile, the RCIC system of Unit 3 stopped at
11:36 on March 12, but later, the HPCI system was auto-
matically activated, which continued to maintain the water
level in the reactor at a certain level. It was confirmed at
02:42 on March 13 that the HPCI system had stopped.
After the HPCI system stopped, TEPCO performed wet
venting to decrease the PCV pressure, and fire engines
began alternative water injection (fresh water) into the
reactor around 09:25 on March 13.
As the PCV pressure increased, PCV venting was
performed several times. As a result, the PCV pressure
decreased. Subsequently, at 11:01 on March 14, a hydrogen
explosion occurred in the upper part of the reactor building.
At 13:25 on March 14, TEPCO determined that the
RCIC system of Unit 2 had stopped because the reactor
water level was decreasing, and began to reduce the RPV
pressure and inject seawater into the reactor using fire-
extinguishing system lines. The wet venting line configura-
tion had been completed by 11:00 on March 13, but the
PCV pressure exceeded the maximum operating pressure.
At 06:00 on March 15, an impulsive sound was reported
near the Suppression Chamber (SC) and the SC pressure
decreased sharply. Later, it was corrected that the reported
explosion sound could have been confused with the explosion
at Unit 4 [2]. 
2.2 Observations on the Event Progression 
The first observation is about the possibility of core
damage in these three units, which can be indicated either
by an increase in the pressure of PCV or a hydrogen
explosion.
As hydrogen is generated by the reaction between the
zirconium cladding and steam during core damage, a
hydrogen explosion could be a direct indication of core
damage.
The pressure increase in the PCV could be also an
indication of core damage. Significant amounts of steam
coming from the reactor vessel during the boil off process
in the core creates a saturated condition within the SC, and
the resulting pressurization causes the steam to be discharged
to the PCV. Also, when a significant amount of hydrogen
is generated from the damaged core, the hydrogen gas would
accumulate in the SC. It would result in a pressurization
of SC and hydrogen gas flow to the PCV. 
The PCV pressure increased well above the design
pressure in Unit 1, while the possibility of the SRVs opening
was suspected. If the SRVs were not opened enough, there
would be a possible leak in the reactor pressure vessel.
The relocation of molten core to the bottom of the reactor
vessel could result in a loss of integrity of the reactor vessel.
The direct path from the reactor vessel to the PCVs would
result in a pressurization of the PCV.
The second observation is about the reason for the
difference in the core damage progression among three units,
which was due to a difference in their core cooling function.
For Unit 1, the Isolation Condenser (IC) was used for
core cooling. Configuration for the Isolation Condenser
in Unit 1 is shown in Fig. 1. The steam generated from the
core goes to the isolation condenser and the condensed
liquid comes back to the reactor vessel, so it is a closed
loop operation. While the steam is condensing, the water
in the shell side of the condenser is heated up. The water
should be refilled to maintain the cooling capability in
the IC. The water inventory can last 8 hours before refill
[1]. The IC can be operated without an external power
supply, as it is a fully passive safety system driven by
gravity. The battery power was necessary for the control
of the system.
However, it was reported by TEPCO that the IC was
not properly operated for Unit 1. It was suspected that the
IC was stopped just after the tsunami, and was never
reactivated [1, 2]. This fact led to an earlier core damage
progression in Unit 1, compared to the other units.
For Units 2 and 3, an RCIC was used for core cooling.
The typical arrangement for the RCIC for these units is
shown in Fig. 2. The steam generated from the reactor
vessel is fed to the RCIC turbine, which drives the RCIC
pump. The steam exiting the RCIC turbine is discharged
to the SC, while the suction of RCIC pump is taken from
the condensate storage tank. The RCIC achieves two
functions of inventory make up and decay heat removal
until the cold water is depleted from the condensate storage
tank. Then, the suction has to be switched to the SC. In
the case of Unit 2, the suction was switched to the SC at
05:00 on March 12 (after 14.2 hrs) and the RCIC failed
finally at 13:18 on March 14. When the water in the SC
reaches a saturated condition and/or there is no battery
power, the RCIC cooling function could be lost. 
The RCIC functioned properly for Units 2 and 3 for a
significant amount of time. The core cooling function was
achieved by the operation of the RCIC. It is suggested that
the RCIC functioned longer than the battery depletion
time of 8 hours, due to a partial load operation with a two
phase inflow [7].
In the case of Unit 3, both the HPCI and RCIC remained
available, whereas the HPCI was not available for Units
1 and 2. The RCIC was operated until 11:36 on March 12
(after 20 hrs). It stopped unexpectedly. An hour after the
RCIC tripped, the HPCI automatically started on a low-
low reactor level signal and began to restore the reactor
water level. Operation of the HPCI is quite similar to that
of the RCIC,  with an injection flow capacity about twice
the size. The HPCI system tripped at 02:42 on March 13
(after 35.9 hrs). Thereafter, no cooling or injection was
available, the reactor core was uncovered, and this led to
core damage. 
The third observation is about the hydrogen explosion
that occurred after the venting operation. It is suspected
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Fig. 1. Configuration of Isolation Condensers on Unit 1 [1]
Fig. 2. Typical Arrangement for Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) for Units 2 and 3 [1]
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that the venting operation resulted in a significant leakage
and subsequent accumulation of hydrogen in the reactor
building. The hydrogen explosion occurred in the reactor
building as it is under an air environment, as it would not
be plausible in the wet-well, where an inert condition was
maintained.
The leakage to the reactor building is suspected to
have occurred either at the containment vessel flange and
airlocks, or due to an opening of a flow path between the
wet well and the reactor building.
The fourth observation is about the radiological
releases. It was reported around 23:00 on March 11 that
the radiation level in the turbine building of Unit 1 was
increasing, which indicates that there was a leakage path
from the reactor vessel to the outside. This could be due
to a failure of the reactor vessel. 
Recently, simulations of the accident progression were
performed by JNES, TEPCO, and IAE as summarized in
Fig. 3 [8]. Please note that except the MELCOR analysis
by JNES in 2009, other analyses were made in 2011, after
the Fukushima accident. Except for the MAAP calculation
performed by TEPCO, it is estimated that the reactor vessel
failure occurred early in the transient. This is very consistent
with the abnormal pressure increase in the PCV, and it
might have resulted in a significant release of hydrogen,
steam, and fission product outside the reactor vessel.
The rapid increase of the dose rate on the operation
floor of the reactor building at about 21:50 on March 11 is
consistent with the failure of the reactor vessel, as this would
certainly result in the release of volatile fission products.
The fifth observation is about the spent fuel pool. In
Unit 4, all the fuel rods in the core had been moved to the
Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). It was reported that at 04:08 on
March 14, the cooling function of Unit 4’s spent fuel pool
was lost, and the water temperature rose to 84 ºC. At around
06:00 on March 15, a hydrogen explosion occurred in the
reactor building, collapsing several floors, the western wall,
and the wall along the stairs[1]. At first it was feared that
the hydrogen explosion was due to the fuel cladding oxida-
tion in the SFP and all the efforts were made to fill the
SFP with water. If there was a leak in the spent fuel pool,
there was a chance of dry out of the water inventory in
the spent fuel pool, which could lead to a fuel failure and
subsequent release of radioactive material. 
However, it was confirmed on March 16 that the afore-
mentioned pool was filled with water and that the fuel was
not exposed. Therefore, it was not possible that hydrogen
could have been produced by a zirconium-water reaction
from the fuel in the SFP. An investigation into the cause
of the explosion suggested that the vent flow, including
hydrogen gas from Unit 3, could have flowed into Unit 4
through the stack junction [2]. Though there seems to be
no significant damage to fuel in the spent fuel pool of
Unit 4, proper indication  of the spent fuel pool conditions
including the level and temperature during accident con-
ditions became a very important safety measure. Therefore,
most regulators, including USNRC, require reliable indi-
cations of the water level in the spent fuel pool [9]. 
Fig. 3. Summary of Fukushima Daiichi Units 1 Event Progression [8]
3. SEVERE ACCIDENT PHENOMENOLOGY AND
PHENOMENOLOGICAL UNCERTAINTIES
Though there are speculations on the event progression
in the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident, there are
no direct indications of the core melt progression, due to
limited measurement data and very limited access to the
inside of the RPV and PCV. 
Here we would like to discuss some of the important
phenomena, including the failure of the reactor vessel,
the hydrogen explosion, and the potential for the re-
criticality.
The fact that the reactor vessel did not fail in the case
of the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident, where a significant
amount of the core melted, gave us an expectation that a
majority of severe accidents would not result in a failure
of the reactor vessel. Investigations on TMI reported three
major findings [10, 11]. (1) Failures of penetrations, such
as in core instrumentation tubes, have been eliminated as
potential failure mechanisms during the TMI-2 event. (2)
Debris cooling occurred within the first 2 hours after debris
relocation. (3) Enhanced debris cooling may have occurred
via coolant traveling in channels within the debris and in
channels between the debris and the vessel. 
For a typical BWR, depressurization of the reactor
pressure vessel is recommended in the severe accident
management guideline [12, 13, 14] to enable alternate water
injection into the core to arrest core damage progression.
It would prevent reactor vessel failure. In the case of Unit
1, it is not clear whether the initial depressurization
resulted from an operator action or due to a failure of the
reactor vessel. Recent studies of the Fukushima accident
[7] indicated that there was a chance of penetration failures,
such source range monitors and intermediate range monitors,
due to buckling at high temperature. Though the timing
and reason of the reactor vessel failure is not clear, it is
indicated there is a high possibility of RPV failure [1, 2].
Though the severe accident analysis computer code
indicated a reactor vessel failure within 4 to 10 hours
after the initiation of a severe accident for typical BWR
and PWR [15, 16], the uncertainties in the modeling of
the reactor vessel failures mechanism allowed a wide
range of vessel failure time predictions, due to lack of
full scale experimental evidence. It is recommended   that
the proper understanding and modeling failure of lower
head penetrations during the severe accident be revisited. 
It is also noted that the reactor vessel failure is an
important issue during the phase of recovery and decon-
tamination of a nuclear power plant. If there is no reactor
vessel failure, like in the case of TMI, a closed loop cooling
and decontamination of the damaged core would be possible.
However, closed loop cooling and decontamination of the
damaged core was not possible in the case of the Fukushima
accident. The water injected into the reactor vessel leaked
into the containment and resulted in a significant accu-
mulation, and accidental release into the sea, of contaminated
water, which became one of the difficult technical problems
to solve during the recovery and decontamination efforts [17].
In a typical BWR, like the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
power plant Units 1, 2, and 3, hydrogen combustion and/or
hydrogen explosion was not considered as a potential
threat, because, as a preventive measure, the PCV is filled
with nitrogen to suppress any hydrogen combustion.
However, hydrogen combustion or explosion was observed
in both Units1 and 3 unexpectedly. It is explained below. 
A substantial amount of steam and hydrogen generation
due to significant core damage resulted in the pressurization
of the PCV. As the PCV failure could lead to a direct large
release of fission product gases to the environment, the
operators tried to vent the PCV in all three units. However,
the manual venting operation was not successful due to
the lack of power supply. Operators had a difficult time
implementing the venting operation. After the venting
operation, an unexpected leakage of hydrogen to the
reactor building resulted in a hydrogen explosion in all
three units with core damage. It was suggested that the
gas mixture leaked though the PCV head flange could
have been migrated to the reactor building could be the
cause of the hydrogen explosion [18].  As the gas mixture,
consisting of steam, combustible gases, and fission product,
would be in contact with air in the reactor building, the
steam condensation could make the mixture gas flammable.
A potential leakage from the PCV and the resultant
migration of combustible gas into the reactor building
had not been considered for the BWR. Therefore, proper
mitigation measures need to be considered for the future.
Either adding a hydrogen mitigation feature, such as passive
autocatalytic re-combiner, or adding a preventive measure
for the PCV leakage could be considered. 
Since the failure of reactor vessel was suspected, it
was further suspected that there could have been molten
core concrete interaction. However, still there is no direct
indication of this. The molten fuel debris relocated into the
lower head filled with water could lead to a re-criticality if
there is a source of neutrons [19]. Reference 19 investigated
the possibility of re-criticality during the re-flood phase
of a severe accident in a boiling water reactor (BWR). In
the case of the Fukushima accident, the sea water had to
be mixed with boron before injection into the reactor vessel
to prevent re-criticality.
4. TOWARD A ROBUST AND RESILIENT SYSTEM
From the lessons we learned from the Fukushima
accident, the plausible questions for the enhancement of
nuclear reactor safety would be about how to set up coherent
safety principles for a severe accident, and what kind of
prevention and mitigation measures are necessary for a
robust and resilient nuclear power system. 
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4.1 Severe Accident Management  
Japan was prepared for a severe accident in terms of
SAMG (Severe Accident Management Guideline). The
Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) of Japan issued a
decision entitled "Accident Management (AM) as a Measure
against Severe Accidents at Power Generating Light Water
Reactors" in May 1992 [13]. The utilities completed
implementation of AM to their NPPs by February 2002,
and reported to the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency
(NISA), which was the regulatory body of NPPs founded
in Japan. 
However, the SAMG for the Fukushima nuclear
power plant turned out to be not able to stop the accident
progression, such that the accident led to a substantial
release of radioactive materials into the environment. It
indicates that there are some weaknesses to be fixed in
the current SAMG, which are discussed below. 
Due to the total loss of AC and DC power supply, the
main control room was blacked out, and critical safety
parameters were not available for the operators in the early
phase of the accident. In the current SAMG, it is assumed
that indications for the important safety parameters are
available for the operators. Operator decisions at the
branching point are based on the observation of the trend
of important safety parameters. However, these trends
were hardly available, such that operators  could not take
proper SAMG actions in the case of the Fukushima accident.
Therefore, the SAMGs should consider unavailability of
important safety parameters.
As for the information on the critical safety parameters,
such as reactor vessel water level, reactor coolant temper-
ature, reactor pressure, and containment pressure, they were
not available from the early phase of the event progression,
due to a loss of all AC and DC power or they gave wrong
indications because the sensor was not qualified for the
severe accident environmental conditions. This fact  suggests
that the sensors, cables, and indicators for the critical
safety parameters required for the SAMG actions should
be qualified for the severe accident conditions, including
temperature, pressure, and radiation. Will there be innovative
techniques to improve the measurement? A candidate could
be a remote power supply, though the transfer distance is
yet to be increased for a practical application. Another
option could be to develop fully analog, or hybrid analog
/digital, measurements with low power consumption. 
In the case of Unit 1, the isolation condenser, which
was the last resort for decay heat removal, was not properly
operated, while the RCIC functioned properly for a sig-
nificant amount of time in the case of Units 2 and 3. It
turned out that the operator was not fully trained for the
operational characteristic of the isolation condenser, including
the operational characteristics of the valves shown in Fig.1.
The plant supervisor and operator did not notice the fact
that the isolation condenser had stopped operation. This
led to a delay in recovery actions, and subsequent core
damage and reactor vessel failure much earlier than in
Units 2 and 3. This suggests that the operator should have
enough training for the operation of the major safety system
during a beyond-design basis situation, like the one
experienced in the Fukushima accident.
Depressurization of the reactor coolant system is a
recommended SAMG action, as it not only prevents the
damage due to the high pressure melt ejection and direct
containment heating, but also enables injection into reactor
coolant system at low pressure. However, it is very difficult
to implement depressurization without a power supply,
because the valves need to be operated at high pressure.
Also, as the timely operation of depressurization is very
critical for the timing of core damage and vessel failure
[14, 16], the power supply to the SRVs should be secured.
A mobile alternative AC power source or battery power
could be prepared to enable activation of the depressurization,
even in the event of SBO.
Because depressurization of the reactor vessel was not
implemented in time, coolant injection into the reactor
vessel was not successful during the early phase of the
accident. There was also lack of available pumps and
borated coolant supply. Sea water injection was implemented
later with an addition of boron to prevent re-criticality
during the late phase injection into RPV. 
Containment venting had to be implemented because
the primary containment pressure stayed well above the
design pressure of the containment. Though, it had to be
activated before substantial damage of the core, the venting
was so late that there was a substantial accumulation of
hydrogen in the suppression chamber and primary con-
tainment vessel. Even though the operator wanted to vent,
it was a very difficult procedure to implement, because
the he had to bring power to the vent valve which was in
an inaccessible location [1]. If there was a provision for
the manual operation driven by compressed air, or a
compressed spring, it could have been much better. It is
recommended   that the mitigation features for a severe
accident be fully passive and rely on natural forces for a
reliable performance. 
The opening of a direct release path from the suppression
pool to the reactor building and to the environment, without
filter, resulted in a substantial release of radioactive material
to the site, and a high dose rate. Highly contaminated debris
from the reactor building structure was spread widely due
to a hydrogen explosion, and resulted in a contamination
of the site in a wide range scale. This heavily slowed the
recovery action. 
Another important point is the leakage of highly
contaminated water to the turbine building. This heavily
hindered and delayed the operators’ actions. There seemed
to be a leak from the reactor vessel and primary containment,
such that water injected into the reactor vessel was mixed
with contaminated water and flowed out to the turbine
building. The dose rate in the turbine building was so high
that the operator was not able to stay there more than 15
minutes, which resulted in a heavily delayed recovery action.
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The above situation is also true for the PWR. When
water is flooded on top of the molten core relocated in the
reactor cavity, it would certainly result in contamination
of the containment. As it would result in a very limited
access for operator action, this aspect should be properly
handled in severe accident management procedures.
4.2 Safety Goals 
The Japanese regulatory body, the Nuclear Safety
Commission issued safety goal in terms of qualitative
health objectives in 2003, such that individual fatality
risks should not exceed 10-6/year. Also, in 2006 the
performance safety goals are specified as Core Damage
Frequency (CDF) of 10-4/yr and Containment Failure
Frequency (CFF) of 10-5/yr [20] for internal events.
For the effectiveness of the AM measures, Japanese
electric utilities issued the results of Probabilistic Safety
Assessments (PSAs) after the AM measures were established
[13]. The results below clearly indicate that the performance
safety goals set by the Japanese regulation are met as below. 
CDF : 1.6 x 10-7 /yr  and CFF : 1.2 x 10-8 /yr  for BWR-4
CDF : 2.4 x 10-8 /yr  and CFF : 5.5 x 10-9 /yr  for BWR-5
The fact that no individuals suffered from prompt
fatality because of the Fukushima accident is consistent
with the performance safety goal. However, the radiological
impacts to the people and environment, and property
damage at the Fukushima accident exceed the tolerability
of people and society. There could be two questions on the
performance goal specified above: “Was the performance
goal proper?” and “Why were those evaluations not able
to predict the occurrence of the Fukushima accident?” 
The first point could be the uncertainties associated
with a PSA. A mean frequency number without uncertainty
was estimated and taken as a criterion, though it has a big
uncertainty. The importance of uncertainty could often
be neglected and forgotten. 
The second point could be that the external events, such
as natural hazards, including earth quake and tsunami, fire,
and terrorist attacks were treated as a probabilistic argument.
If the probability was very low, it was not considered in the
design basis for the nuclear power plant. For example, the
effects of a tsunami of an unprecedented height and pro-
longed station blackout were not properly accounted for. 
The values of a PSA, which can be summarized as a
language for quantifying uncertainty, a structured view of
plant dependencies and interactions, a rational integrated
view of plant response in terms of consequences, their
likelihood, and the responsible contributing factors, and a
flexible tool for managing plant safety, are very useful
and valid [21]. Then the question is how we can augment
or develop an innovative PSA frame where we can incor-
porate unexpected events with high risk, such as those
that occurred in the Fukushima accident. A deterministic
safety analysis frame to prevent or mitigate the consequence
of very low probability scenarios should be added to
augment the PSA. 
As the Fukushima accident resulted in a huge loss in
property and wide spread contamination of the soil, air,
and water, the above safety goals are no longer acceptable
to society, especially for highly populated countries. The
safety goals for limiting radiological releases need to be
defined to complement current safety goals on quantitative
health objectives, CDF and CFF. 
Already in northern Europe, countries like Finland
have regulations on the the radiological release  during a
severe accident, such that an atmospheric release of
caesium-137 is limited to 100 TBq as specified in YVL
2.2 [22]. Recently, IAEA also proposed a specific safety
requirement [23] for the design extension condition, which
is stated as “The design shall be such that design extension
conditions that could lead to significant radioactive releases
are practically eliminated”. However, as there are big
uncertainties in methodologies for evaluating the radiological
consequences, further study is recommended before setting
up a quantitative goal. 
5. REMARK   
The very low probability of a severe accident led to a
wide gap between pessimistic views and optimistic views
for the necessity of mitigation measures for the nuclear
power plants. Each country has different philosophies
and regulations for dealing with severe accidents. As a
minimum, SAMGs were provided for most operating
nuclear reactors in the world, to be prepared for a severe
accident. However, the SAMG prepared for  Fukushima
was not able to stop the progression of the accident, such
that it led to a substantial release of radioactive materials
into the environment. 
In the frame of the current SAMG, there is no analysis
for the practical aspects of recovery actions in the worst
case scenario. It was assumed that even during the severe
accident progression there would be something available
for a successful recovery action, the feasibility of which
was not seriously investigated. There should be more
reliable, tolerant, diverse measures based on the defense-
in-depth concept, and implemented as a passive system.
Also, diversity and redundancy for the indication of reactor
status and availability of safety systems is required to
assure that recovery actions are effective in the worst
case scenarios. 
As a summary, it is suggested that an investigation into
the coherent integrated safety principles for a severe accident,
and development of innovative mitigation features are
necessary for a robust and resilient nuclear power system.
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NOMENCLATURE 
ADS Automatic Depressurization System 
CDF Core Damage Frequency
CFF Containment Failure Frequency
CS Core Spray System
ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System 
EDGs Emergency Diesel Generators 
HPCI High Pressure Core Injection System
IC Isolation Condenser, 
INES International Nuclear Events Scale 
LPCI Low Pressure Core Injection System
NCS Nuclear Safety Commission 
RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System. 
SAMG Severe Accident Management Guideline
SC Suppression Chamber  
SFP Spent Fuel Pool 
SRV Safety Relief Valves 
TEPCO Tokyo Electric Power Company 
TMI Three Mile Island
PCV Primary Containment Vessel 
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